A Critical Analysis of the Arguments from Alternation and Recollection for the Immortality of the Soul in Plato’s Phaedo
Soul has been conceived as an essential element of human composition. In Philosophy and other related discipline, its study and treatment have generated attentions and contributions from scholars in these various fields. Plato, in his own conception, affirms the reality of soul, its importance to human being and its transcendental works which he has shown in some of his dialogues. It is in line with this that Plato advances arguments for reincarnation, an aspect of the immortality of the soul. This paper, therefore, attempts a critical analysis of the arguments from alternation and recollection for the immortality of the soul in Plato’s Phaedo. It argues that Plato fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt the reality of the soul. It also mentions that its proof for reincarnation which is hinged on the reality of the soul is not tenable. The paper, therefore, concludes, using the method of philosophical argumentation, that the arguments are neither plausible nor tenable enough to establish his claim.
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